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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981286-CA 
vs. : 
FREDERICK P. PADGETT, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Washington County, Utah, Honorable Judge James L. Shumate presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search 
based on its finding that defendant voluntarily stopped to talk 
to officers and consented to the search? 
"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a 
bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a clearly 
erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Ribe, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
876 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v. Thurmam 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). "The trial court's ultimate 
determination of the level of a police stop is a legal conclusion which we review for 
correctness." State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on December 15, 1997 with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8 (2)(a)(i)(e) (1998); one count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), 
a Class-B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i)(e) (1998); and one 
count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class-B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5 (1998) (R.l-2). He filed a Motion to Suppress evidence found during a 
warrantless search of his person (R. 23-25). Following a hearing on April 27, 1998, the 
trial court denied the motion (R. 37, 66 at 36). 
Defendant entered conditional guilty pleas on all three counts (R. 38-47). The trial 
court imposed a zero-to-five-year prison sentence on the felony conviction, but stayed 
2 
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imposition of sentence on the misdemeanors (R. 46, 67 at 15). The court ordered that 
defendant's prison term run concurrently with another sentence not at issue in this appeal 
GsL). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 48). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officers Gordon McCracken and Ron Isaacson were on bicycle patrol of shopping 
areas in St. George during the Christmas season of 1997 (R. 66 at 5). They were 
patrolling a strip of shops in the K-Mart plaza on December 12 when they saw defendant 
by a planter in front of Albertson's (R. 66 at 5-6). Defendant, who had apparently been 
sitting on the planter, had just gotten on his bicycle to ride off (R. 66 at 6). 
McCracken thought he recognized defendant as an individual who had been 
arrested by other officers two or three weeks earlier for shoplifting at Lynn's Marketplace 
(id.). During a search incident to that arrest, officers found defendant in possession of ffa 
lot of drugs and a knife" (id.), or "drugs, paraphernalia, and a couple of knives" (R.66 at 
9). McCracken pointed defendant out to Isaacson and told Isaacson he believed that 
defendant was the individual arrested at Lynn's (R. 66 at 6, 23). As McCracken later 
explained, "I had the prior knowledge of his criminal background. He was by another 
supermarket. I decided to initiate a Level 1 contact[1] to see how he was doing and if he 
Utah's appellate courts recognize three levels of police-citizen encounters: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose 
3 
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had any warrants from the earlier arrest" (R. 66 at 10). Although the officer later 
acknowledged that he did not have reasonable suspicion, "I don't think I needed 
reasonable suspicions to make a Level 1 contact (R. 66 at 10-11, 13 
McCracken said to Isaacson, "Let's go talk with him" (R. 66 at 6, 23-24). 
Isaacson pedaled up alongside defendant, and said "Hi, how are you doing?" (R. 
66 at 6, 8, 21-22, 24). Defendant and Isaacson brought their bikes to a halt (R. 66 at 8, 
12, 22). Isaacson stopped to the right side and ahead of defendant, but not directly in 
front of him (R. 66 at 14,22). 
Defendant replied, "Fine" (R. 66 at 25). 
"Where are you headed?" asked Isaacson (id.). 
Defendant said he was heading toward the Santa Clara / Ivins area (id.). 
"Gosh, isn't it cold to ride a bike that far?" asked Isaacson (id.). 
"Yeah, it is pretty cold," defendant said. He began to explain that he rode that 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense had been 
committed or is being committed. 
State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). 
4 
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distance all the time (id.). 
By that point, McCracken had joined his partner and defendant, having arrived two 
to five seconds after Isaacson initiated contact (R. 66 at 6 ). McCracken stood behind 
defendant on defendant's left side (R. 66 at 14, 22). Defendant's direction of travel was 
not impeded (R. 66 at 14,22). 
McCracken asked defendant's name "because I wanted to put all my ducks in a 
row and make sure that I was not getting him confused with another subject that was 
described as he was on a bicycle" (R. 66 at 9). Defendant replied "Frederick Padgett" 
(id.). McCracken put defendant's name and date of birth into his computer "to check and 
see if he had any warrants or anything like that for his arrest" (id.). McCracken then 
asked defendant if he was the same individual arrested for shoplifting at Lynn's 
Marketplace (id.). Defendant admitted that he was (id.). 
McCracken asked if defendant was in possession of any drugs, and defendant said 
he was not (id.). McCracken asked him "if he would mind if I checked for myself, and 
he said that he did not mind and granted consent...." (R. 66 at 10). 
"Right off the bat in his right front jacket pocket," McCracken found a disposable 
lighter that had been modified to store drugs (R. 66 at 11). The lighter contained 
marijuana wrapped in cellophane (id.). Defendant was placed under arrest (id.). 
Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the contraband found during the search 
(R. 23). The trial judge denied the motion, finding that defendant stopped to talk to the 
5 
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officers voluntarily: 
Mr. Padgett has the same right that you or I would have had under 
the same circumstances to continue on. He has no obligation to talk to the 
officers. Common courtesy would at least have elicited a response from 
Mr. Padgett, but the law does not demand common courtesy. Mr. Padgett 
could have kept on going and continued on. 
And the officers, if they had stopped him, commanded him to do so 
at that point without any other facts or circumstances, probably would have 
tainted everything that happened. But that's not what happened here. Mr. 
Padgett voluntarily stopped, and the officers engaged him in conversation, 
and he engaged them in conversation. He could have remained absolutely 
silent, did not have to respond to any request for search or anything else, but 
he did. 
And I see no illegality on the part of the officers' conduct. Their 
contact with him was a Level 1 stop specifically directed at finding out if 
this person was the same man who had been reported to Officer McCracken 
as Frederick Padgett who had been arrested at Lynn's some three weeks 
before. 
Mr. Padgett did not have to respond or stop or anything else, but he 
did. And I find that he did so voluntarily. I do not see any coercive action 
on the part of these officers there at that scene that would indicate to me 
that they acted with excessive use of their authority under the 
circumstances. 
(R. 66 at 35-36, Addendum A). In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
issued May 29, 1998, the court found that defendant consented to the search, and 
concluded that Mthe stop and search were permissible because of the Defendant's consent'1 
(R. 50, Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly determined that defendant voluntarily stopped to talk to 
the officers. Therefore, defendant was not detained against his will, and no seizure 
6 
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occurred. The Fourth Amendment allows officers to approach individuals and ask them 
questions, and does not require that officers have reasonable suspicion or any other 
justification for doing so. Additionally, as the trial court found, the officers did not 
engage in any show of authority either to force defendant to remain or to gain defendant's 
consent to the search. The brief encounter occurred in a public place, all parties were on 
bicycles, defendant stopped without being requested to do so, and the officers engaged 
defendant in polite conversation prior to asking him his identity and whether he would 
mind if they searched him. Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person 
would have understood that he was free to either leave or to decline the officers' requests. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT SEIZED SIMPLY BECAUSE OFFICERS APPROACHED HIM, 
ENGAGED HIM IN CASUAL CONVERSATION, AND THEN 
RECEIVED HIS CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS PERSON 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that defendant was not seized 
wrhen the officers approached him and engaged him in conversation. Appellant's Brief at 
4-10. Defendant correctly acknowledges that not every encounter between law 
enforcement and private individuals amounts to a seizure. Appellant's Brief at 4; see also 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). However, he asserts that here a seizure 
took place because a reasonable person in his circumstances would not have felt free to 
7 
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leave. Appellant's Brief at 8. 
"A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality of 
. the circumstances, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person 
that the person was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter and go about his or her business." State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 
1994) (citing United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). "[A] seizure 
occurs where an officer by show of authority or physical force in some way restricts the 
liberty of an individual." State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State 
v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987)), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
"[Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does 
not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.... Unless the circumstances of the 
encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have 
believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the 
questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment." I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 216 (1984). See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1987) (level one 
encounter where, at officer's request, defendant crossed street to officer's vehicle and 
provided identification); Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1005-06 (Utah App.) 
(consensual encounter occurred where defendant left nightclub to talk to officers, 
provided identification, and answered officer's questions), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 
(Utah 1996). 
8 
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Contrary to defendant's assertions, police officers do not require reasonable 
suspicion or other justification to approach citizens and engage in consensual questioning 
of them. Appellant's Brief at 4, 7. "We have stated that even when officers have no basis 
for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, 
ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search his or her 
luggage — as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance is required." 
Florida v. BosticL 501 U.S. at 434-35. "[T]he proposition that police officers can 
approach individuals as to whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them 
potentially incriminating questions . . . has been endorsed by the Court any number of 
times." Id at 439. Accord State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985, 987 (Utah App. 1994) 
(level one encounter where officer approached the defendant, asked defendant what he 
was doing, and requested defendant's identification). 
The police enjoy the same right as any other citizens to address questions to other 
persons, so long as the circumstances do not indicate that compliance is required. 
Mendenhall 446 U.S. at 553 (citation omitted). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that the effectiveness of law enforcement agents would be hampered if 
officers were not free to question citizens. "[Characterizing every street encounter 
between a citizen and the police as a 'seizure,' while not enhancing any interest secured 
by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide 
variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. The Court has . . . referred to the 
9 
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acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the 
criminal laws." MendenhalL 446 U.S. at 554. Defendant incorrectly suggests that the 
officers' subjective intentions are relevant to the determination of whether defendant was 
seized during the officers' questioning of him, implying that the officers had more in 
mind than - as the trial court found - simply confirming his identity (R. 66 at 26-27, 36). 
Appellant's Brief at 7, 8. Defendant asserts that in deciding whether an unlawful 
detention took place, this Court should take into account the fact that defendant "had just 
been released from jail when yet another set of officers in uniform and armed approached 
him and asked him questions concerning his identity and his prior case." Appellant's 
Brief at 8. However, the reasonable person standard articulated in MendenhalL Bostick, 
Higgins, Carter, Trujillo, and other cases is an objective standard whose application does 
not vary with either the subjective intentions of the officers or the individual perspective 
or sensitivities of the subject involved. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
813 (1996) ("the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain 
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent"); Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438 ("the 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person... 
. The fact that respondent knew the search was likely to turn up contraband is of course 
irrelevant; the potential intrusiveness of the officers' conduct must be judged from the 
viewpoint of an innocent person in [respondent's] position.") (emphasis in original, 
citations and internal quotation marks itted); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 
10 
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(1988) (reasonable person standard "ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being 
approached"); U.S. v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. at 554 n. 6 (1980) ("the subjective intention 
[of the officer] is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the 
respondent"). Therefore, in determining whether a reasonable person would have 
believed he was seized under the circumstances, neither the officers' subjective intentions 
nor defendant's individual mental state is relevant. 
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure . . . would be [1] the 
threatening presence of several uniformed officers; [2] the display of a weapon by an 
officer; [3] some physical touching of the person of the citizen; or [4] the use of language 
or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be 
compelled."2 Mendenhall 446 U.S. 554-555, see also State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 
658 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d at 463. "In the absence of some such 
evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police 
cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person." Mendenhall 446 U.S. at 
555. 
2
"Other courts have looked to additional factors in evaluating the nature of an 
encounter. These factors include the length of an interview, blocking an individual's 
path, retaining an individual's travel ticket, the removal of the defendant to a private area, 
statements by police that an investigation has focused on the individual, or searching the 
defendant's belongings or person." State v. Carter, 812 P.2d at 463 (citation omitted). 
None of these factors is present here except that the officers subsequently searched 
defendant. However, the search was pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent. 
11 
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None of the factors articulated in Mendenhall was present during the officers' 
encounter with defendant. Although the officers were both in uniform, nothing in the 
record indicates that the two officers on bicycle patrol would have been perceived as 
threatening to a reasonable person. The record demonstrates that the officers did not 
draw or otherwise "display" any weapons, and did not touch defendant or speak 
threateningly to him. On the contrary, Officer Isaacson engaged defendant in cycling-
related chitchat prior to Officer McCracken's questions about his identity and request to 
search. The questions posed to defendant were phrased not as demands, but as polite 
requests. Defendant was not asked to stop his bicycle, but stopped of his own volition 
after Officer Isaacson rode up. In short, the record amply supports the trial court's 
findings that the officers did nothing to coerce defendant's cooperation, and that his 
participation in the encounter was voluntary (R.50, 66 at 36-37). The officers did not 
engage in any show of authority, and the circumstances would not have intimidated a 
reasonable person. Accord Chesternut 486 U.S. at 575-76 (no seizure where police 
accelerated patrol car to catch up with fleeing suspect and drove alongside him, but did 
not activate siren, command suspect to halt, display weapons, or block suspect's course; 
police conduct "not 'so intimidating' that respondent could reasonably have believed that 
he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about his business"). 
Defendant admits that the officers did not block his path, but states that because 
the officers positioned themselves for officer safety reasons on either side of defendant, 
12 
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with one officer to the front of defendant and the other to the rear, a reasonable person 
would not have felt free to leave. Appellant's Brief at 8. Although the officers were 
motivated by safety concerns in positioning themselves (R. 14),3 the record does not 
indicate that the officers assumed any aggressive or defensive postures that would have 
intimidated or restricted a reasonable person. Since the officers' subjective concerns were 
not communicated to defendant, a reasonable person in defendant's shoes would not have 
attached any significance to the officers' positions. See MendenhalU 446 U.S. at 555 n. 6 
(D.E.A. agent's subjective intentions irrelevant except insofar as they may have been 
conveyed to defendant). 
Defendant's contention that the warrants check was an intrusion on defendant's 
liberty is similarly void of record support. Appellant's Brief at 6. As argued above, 
defendant was not detained during the warrants check. In addition, the record does not 
reflect that the warrants check added any time at all to the conversation.4 Cf State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452-52 (Utah 1995) (officer's conducting a warrants check 
during lawful detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not 
significantly extend the period of detention) (citing State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 
3The officers knew that defendant was found to be in possession of a knife 
following his prior arrest for shoplifting (R. 66 at 6,9). 
4It appears that the officer typed defendant's name into his computer during the 
parties' conversation, and there is no indication that the warrant check was even 
completed prior to defendant consenting to the search. 
13 
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1133(Utah 1994)). 
Defendant cites State v. Carter . 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), as support for his contention that he was seized Mat least at the 
time the officers requested that he allow a search of his person." Appellant's Brief at 10, 
12. However, the facts in this case are quite different from the facts in Carter. In Carter, 
the defendant was putting his luggage into a taxi at the airport when an officer came up to 
him, identified himself as an officer, and asked if defendant would talk with him. 812 P. 
2d at 461-62. Carter consented, removed his bag from the taxi and accompanied the 
officer to a location outside the terminal about 20 feet away. Id at 462. The officer 
asked to see Carter's plane ticket, and inspected it. jd . A second officer arrived as the 
first officer requested identification. Id As Carter searched his bag for identification, the 
second officer noticed a line under his shirt. Id The second officer identified himself as 
a narcotics officer and asked to search Carter's bag. Id Carter agreed. Id. As the officer 
began to search the bag, the first officer asked Carter if he could search Carter's person. 
Id. This Court held that a seizure occurred "at least at the point where [the first officer] 
asked to conduct a pat-down search of defendant." Id at 470. 
Carter involved much stronger indications of detention than this case. First, the 
officers in this case did not approach defendant and ask to speak to him, curtail his 
departure, or take him to another location for questioning. Second, the officers in this 
case did not ask to examine any identification or other documents. Third, neither officer 
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in this case announced that he was working narcotics, or made any other statements that 
could have been interpreted by a reasonable person as indicating that an investigative net 
was tightening around him. Fourth, the encounter in this case was distinctly casual, 
involving Officer Isaacson and defendant engaging in innocuous small talk in a public 
place. Fifth, although the exact length of the encounter in this case is not specified in the 
record, its duration was obviously much shorter than the encounter in Carter. 
This Court did not hold in Carter, as defendant seems to argue, that a mere request 
to search, by itself, transforms a consensual police-citizen encounter into a level two 
detention requiring reasonable suspicion. Instead, the Court simply recognized that by 
the point at which a pat-down search was requested of Carter, a reasonable person, in the 
face of focused, persistent, and escalating investigation, would not have felt free to 
disregard the officer's questions and go about his business. In this case, by contrast, a 
reasonable person would have. 
In summary, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the encounter 
between the officers and defendant was consensual, and did not amount to a level two 
seizure (R. 50, 66 at 36). Therefore, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not 
implicated. This Court should accordingly affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Defendant's Claim that his Consent to the Officers' Search was 
"Not Lawfully Obtained'* Was Neither Preserved Below nor 
Adequately Briefed on Appeal. 
"While the tests for evaluating the voluntariness of consent to search and the 
nature of an encounter are similar and may overlap, they are not identical and merit 
separate consideration." State v. Carter, 812 P.2d at 465. Defendant has not maintained 
either at the trial level or on appeal that his consent to the officers' search was not 
voluntary. However, he claims that his consent was not lawfully obtained. Appellant's 
Brief at 12. He devotes two sentences to this claim, the second of which merely states 
that "[f]or the consent to be lawfully obtained the consent must be voluntary and the 
consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Id. 
Defendant has waived any opportunity to contest the validity of his consent on 
appeal. A claim of error must be presented to the trial court in a timely and specific 
manner in order to preserve an issue for appeal. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 
(Utah App. 1997); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996). "It is a well-
established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trail court is 
generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 
(Utah App. 1996), cert, denied 931 P.2d 186 (Utah 1997). Defendant has failed to present 
any grounds justifying departure from the usual rule that an issue not timely and 
specifically raised is waived on appeal. 
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Additionally, defendant has failed to adequately brief any claims that his consent 
was involuntary or that police exploited a prior illegality in obtaining it. Under rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party to an appeal must provide an 
argument containing the "contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." When a party 
fails to comply with this rule, Utah's appellate courts decline to address the issue raised 
because "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)); see also Burns v. 
Summerhays. 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). "Utah courts routinely decline to 
consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah 
App. 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to 
address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and 
authority to support his argument"). 
Although defendant's claim that his consent was unlawfully obtained was both 
waived and inadequately briefed, even if this Court were to reach the merits, the claim 
would fail. To determine the voluntariness of consent, 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
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"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting State v. Carter. 812 P.2d at 
467). As to the first factor, there is no evidence that defendant's consent was equivocal or 
vague, and in fact Officer McCracken testified that defendant stated unequivocally that 
"he did not mind" if the officer searched him (R. 66 at 10). As to the second factor, this 
Court, in determining whether consent was given without duress or coercion, considers 
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to 
search; 4) cooperation by the [defendant]; and 5) the absence of deception 
or trick on the part of the officer. 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d at 467 (quoting State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980). All five factors are present in this case (R. 66 at 10-11), demonstrating that the 
trial court properly found that no coercion occurred (R. 66 at 36). 
In short, under Carter and Ham, the trial court's conclusion that defendant's 
voluntarily consented to the search was correct (R. 35-36). And, although defendant 
states without analysis or argument that a consent to search must not be obtained by 
police exploitation of a prior illegality, there was no prior illegality in this case. Since no 
seizure (lawful or otherwise) occurred, defendant's consent to the search was not tainted 
by any prior illegality. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of / U A I L U / -
1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON^ 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ " ^ day of A/lxJLXj^ 1999,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to Kenneth L. 
Combs. Sherri Palmer & Associates, 285 W. Tabernacle, Suite 306, St. George, Utah 
84770. 
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Q. Officer Isaacson, you said, "Hi," something 
to that effect. 
What did you say before Officer McCracken came up? 
A. I said, "Hi, how are you doing?" 
He said, "Fine." 
I said, "Where are you headed?" 
And he said he was heading towards the Santa 
Clara/Ivins area. 
And I remember it being cold, and I said, 
"Gosh, isn't it cold to ride a bike that far?" 
And he said, "Yeah, it is pretty cold." And 
he began to tell me how he rides that distance all the 
time . 
Q. Okay. And at this point Officer McCracken is 
still coming up? 
A. He was there by the side, and he said, 
"Aren't you Fred Padgett?" 
And he said, "Yes, I am." 
MR. SHAUM: Thank you. No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything more? 
MR. COMBS: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, 
Mr. Isaacson. You can have a seat here in the 
courtroom. 
Well, counsel, I can give you some findings 
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of fact at this point and then let you argue the law 
from there. 
The facts, as the court sees them now, is 
that on the date in question, which is December 12 of 
1997, Officer McCracken and Isaacson on bike patrol at 
the commercial center shopping area in St. George saw 
Mr. Padgett and his bicycle. 
At that time, seeing Mr. Padgett and 
believing that Mr. Padgett was, in fact, Mr. Padgett who 
had been arrested some weeks before at the Lynn's store, 
Officer McCracken expressed a desire to contact Mr. 
Padgett and make sure this was the same person and to 
engage him in conversation. 
The officers went in Mr. Padgett's direction. 
Officer Isaacson greeted him saying something along the 
lines of, "Hello," or, " Hi / or, "How are you doing?" or 
something like that. 
And at that point Mr. Padgett brought his 
bicycle to a stop, Officer Isaacson brought his bicycle 
to a stop, and Officer McCracken arrived at that scene 
on the other side of Mr. Padgett at that location so 
that Mr. Padgett was between the two officers and their 
bicycles, Mr. Padgett and his bicycle. 
At that location Mr. McCracken asked Mr. 
Padgett what his name was and if he was the same fellow 
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who had been arrested at Albertson's -- or at Lynn's 
market some weeks before. 
Now, I think those are the facts that are 
pertinent to this inquiry. Everything that comes 
thereafter is a logical sequence of that initial 
encounter there where all three are stopped with their 
bicycles near the -- oh, shucks, I'm a Judge. I can 
call it -- it's the north door of Albertson's. 
And Officer McCracken and I will go off in 
the country some day and discuss it. 
But prior to that time that's where it took 
place, and I think that's what happened. 
Now, legally where do we stand with the 
reasonable inquiry of the officer? Can it be made at 
that point, Mr. Combs? I guess you're arguing there is 
no reason to even engage in a Level 1 encounter with Mr. 
Padgett at all with the officer's intent to go talk with 
him. Constitutionally, they're not allowed to do so, 
certainly not allowed to go over and stop him, ask him 
to stop. 
MR. COMBS:
 % Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COMBS: This is more of a Terry 
situation, if you ask me. And even Terry says that if a 
person is basically on foot, the officer needs 
Utah District Courts 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are bike patrol. They are on their bicycles. The same 
difference. They didn't have flashers. It wasn't Level 
2 or anything else (inaudible). 
I think the totality of the circumstances, a 
reasonable person, what they would believe, whether or 
not they were free to go -- and the officers, obviously, 
they thought he had drugs on him. And they kept on and 
kept on until they got a search of Mr. Padgett, and they 
found those drugs, and they arrested him. It wasn't a 
chance meeting. 
Your Honor, I believe the stop and search was 
an illegal and the seizure was illegal. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
Counsel, I find that Mr. Padgett's stop for 
the officers was voluntary. Mr. Padgett has the same 
right that you or I would have had under the same 
circumstances to continue on. He has no obligation to 
talk to the officers. Common courtesy would at least 
have elicited a response from Mr. Padgett, but the law 
does not demand common courtesy. Mr. Padgett could have 
kept on going and continued on. 
And the officers, if they had stopped him, 
commanded him to do so at that point without any other 
facts or circumstances, probably would have tainted 
everything that happened. But that's not what happened 
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here, Mr. Padgett voluntarily stopped, and the officers 
engaged him in conversation, and he engaged them in 
conversation. He could have remained absolutely silent, 
did not have to respond to any request for search or 
anything else, but he did. 
And I see no illegality on the part of the 
officers1 conduct. Their contact with him was a Level 1 
stop specifically directed at finding out if this person 
was the same man who had been reported to Officer 
McCracken as Frederick Padgett who had been arrested at 
Lynn's some three weeks before. 
Mr. Padgett did not have to respond or stop 
or anything else, but he did. And I find that he did so 
voluntarily. I do not see any coercive action on the 
part of these officers there at that scene that would 
indicate to me that they acted with excessive use of 
their authority under the circumstances. 
So the motion to suppress is overruled and 
denied, and the matter will be set for trial as quickly 
as we can. 
Now, what should we do with Mr. Padgett's 
other case, the '1309 case, counsel? We have not had 
sentencing on that matter. 
MR. SHAUM: Your Honor, the state is ready to 
proceed with that, if you want to do it today. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Combs, are you ready to 
proceed with sentencing on f1309? 
MR. COMBS: May I have just a moment, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Certainly, counsel. 
MR. COMBS: Your Honor, I don't know if I 
have complete papers on the case we just heard. My 
client is inclined to do a conditional plea on the case 
we just heard, and I think the state's recommendation 
would be to run it concurrent with the other case. 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, why don't we go ahead 
and continue both of these until 1:30 tomorrow afternoon 
and get that together? Let's get it done so that Mr. 
Padgett can get on with his life rather than hang around 
with us all the time and get this plea entered and take 
it up on appeal, if you need to, because the law is 
pretty unclear. Maybe we'll make some law, but let's 
learn about it. And we will put both on at 1:30 
tomorrow afternoon. 
MR. COMBS: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
We're adjourned for the day. 
-0O0-
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Eric A. Ludlow #5104 
Washington County Attorney 
Ryan J. Shaum #7622 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84771 
(801)634-5723 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
FREDRICK POWELL PADGETT, ] 
Defendant. ... ] 
> FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
1 OF LAW AND ORDER 
I Criminal No. 971501416 
i HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
This case came before the Court for a Hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on 
April 27, 1998, the State was represented by Ryan J. Shaum, Deputy Washington County 
Attorney. The Defendant was present, and was represented by his attorney, Kenneth L. Combs. 
The Court, after hearing the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel, enters the 
following: 
1. On December 12, 1997, in Washington County, Utah, St. George Police Officers 
observed the Defendant riding a bicycle at the K-Mart shopping center, in front of Albertsons 
Grocery, and Tom Tom Record Store. 
2. Officers thought they recognized the Defendant from another incident involving the 
Defendant which had taken place a couple of weeks prior. 
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3. Officers were on bike patrol in the area, and approaching the Defendant they 
extended a greeting, as did the Defendant. 
4. The Officer's intent was to initiate a level one voluntary contact. However, the 
Defendant stopped without being asked to do so. 
5. Officer McCracken had prior knowledge that Defendant had been involved in illegal 
drug activity in the recent past. 
6. Officer McCracken asked if he could search the Defendant, and the Defendant 
consented to the search. 
7. Subsequently, marijuana, methamphetamine and paraphernalia were found on the 
Defendant's person. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant has no standing to contest Officer McCracken's search of the 
Defendant. The stop was reasonable for a level one inquiry by Police Officers. 
2. Even if the Defendant has standing, the stop and search were permissible because of 
the Defendant's consent. 
3. Officers were acting within the scope of their authority. 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is over ruled and denied. 
Dated the ^f of &L^y . 1998. 
HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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